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Capital gains taxes are important sources of government income in particular in high tax 
Scandinavian countries. Theses taxes, nevertheless, likely distort the market and resource 
allocations through so called “lock-in” effect by discouraging trade transactions that would trigger 
the tax payments. When it comes to agricultural land, the lock-in effect implies that, along the 
structural development, the land ownership and active farming gradually deviate from each other 
and land tenancy increases. Increasing land tenancy and land tenure insecurity have shown to incur 
a significant social cost, because they discourage and delay irreversible land improvements that 
would be necessary for maintaining land productivity. Therefore, the knowledge about the trade-off 
between the level of capital gains taxes, land sales and, thus, the resulting fiscal revenues is 
valuable in designing optimal tax policies.  
 
This study estimates the fiscal effects of reduction in capital gains taxes imposed on land sales and 
provides grounds for optimizing the tax scheme. The results suggest that certain temporary tax 
waiver programs could maintain the current tax revenues with less trade distorting effects on the 
land market. By simulating the land trade quantities conditional on alternative tax rates, the study 
gives information on how much a particular tax waiver program would trigger land sales. The 
results signal that tax waiver programs could shift the current structural development pattern of 
gradually increasing tenancy and land tenure insecurity to a pattern, in which the share of land 
ownership would be increased. 
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Introduction 
Capital gains taxes are, in addition to labour and capital income taxes, an essential part of fiscal 
policies in most countries. They are important, in particular, in Scandinavian countries where the 
public sectors are large, as compared to other economic sectors, and the share of taxes out from the 
total GDP is amongst the highest in Europe. Nevertheless, the existing literature supports the view 
that capital gains taxes also have significant market distortion effects and adverse effects in the real 
economies. They likely distort the market and resource allocations through so called “lock-in” 
effect, which has a tendency to postpone asset sales and to discourage trade transactions that trigger 
the tax payments (Ayers et al. 2007; Daunfeldt et al. 2007; Dammon and Spatt 1996; Holt and 
Shelton 1962). The lock-in effects would most probably apply also land assets.   
When it comes to agricultural land, at least in many European countries, the lock-in 
effect implies that, along the structural development in agriculture, the land ownership and active 
farming deviate from each other. Land ownership fragments through heritage gradually to a larger 
and larger number of individual land owners, while competition and structural adjustment programs 
oncentrate active farming through land tenancy into a smaller and smaller number of active farmers.  
When more land is cultivated under lease contracts, land tenure insecurity increases and affects 
adversely real economies. Recent literature reveals that increasing land tenure insecurity 
significantly discourage and delay irreversible land improvements that would be necessary for 
maintaining productivity of land and arable farming (Soule et al. 2000; Myyrä et al. 2006; Yoder et 
al. 2008). At the same time agricultural and environmental policies reach a decreasing number of 
the true land owners losing their efficiency. 
Even if the significant market distortion effects and adverse economic effects are 
acknowledged in the asset markets, the existing literature does not, nevertheless, include analysis on 
how these problems, driven up by the lock-in effect could be solved in the agricultural land market, 
and how elastic the land sales decisions would be with respect to adjustments in the capital gains   3
taxes. Similarly, we do not currently have estimates on the marginal fiscal effects, if certain tax 
waives were scheduled in the land market.  
New knowledge about the magnitude of the trade distortion effects of capital gains 
taxes in land market has high policy relevance for several reasons. First, in many countries the trade 
for land is a crucial element and determinant in steering the necessary structural developments and 
improving productivity of their agricultural sectors. Second, if the capital gains tax turns out to 
exhibit significant lock-in effects, it drives a wedge between the development of land ownership 
and active farming. This would imply that the current tendency of gradually fragmenting land 
ownership and its deviation from active farming could be reversed by revisiting the tax policies, and 
the value of land as an income generating asset for its owner could be enhanced. Finally, the income 
distribution and spill over effects of agricultural support to landowners could be more predictable 
when the future Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) are designed in Europe (Ciaian and Swinnen 
2006). So far, the results from decoupling the CAP-supports from agricultural production have been 
two fold and farmland prices are still increasing in many European countries. The shortcut to 
achieve the goals of CAP is to rejoin agricultural landownership and agricultural production. This 
makes temporary reduction on capital gain tax on farmland sales interesting instrument from 
agricultural policy point of view. 
The capital gains tax on land sales raises at least two important empirical questions. 
First, is the tax rate set optimally, so that there does not exist a lower tax rate, which could collect at 
least the same tax revenue with less distorting trade effects. And more broadly, if the tax rate is 
adjusted how much do these adjustments affect tax revenues. Second, do these taxes distort land 
market and do they discourage trade for land to the extent that is harmful for the necessary 
developments in the agricultural sector.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by simulating land owners’ willingness 
to sell their land under alternative capital gains tax rates, imposed on their land sales. The   4
econometric model underlying the simulations has been estimated based on a survey data from 
Finland by Myyrä and Pouta (2009). This study extends the analysis of Myyrä and Pouta (2009) and 
focus on practical tax policy design with two main goals. The first goal is to estimate the fiscal 
effects of the capital gains taxes imposed on land sales. These results provide new grounds for 
optimizing the tax scheme while taking into an account both fiscal and market distorting effects. 
The results suggest that certain temporary tax waiver programs could maintain the current tax 
revenues with less trade distorting effects on the land market. The second goal is to simulate the 
land trade volumes on alternative tax rates. These results give signals how much certain tax waiver 
programs would trigger land sales and help in solving the land tenure problems.   
  In the rest of the paper we first discuss about land as an asset under capital gains taxes 
and introduce Finnish case of land trade and taxation. Based on survey data and models form Myyrä 
and Pouta (2009) we present the simulation results of varying tax schemes.   
 
Capital gains tax and land as an asset        
Over the last decade, the importance of capital gains taxes in collecting government income in the 
high tax countries has increased, because the international tax competition has accumulated 
pressures to cut high labour and capital income tax rates. It is evident that the capital gains tax is an 
attractive means of generating tax income particularly in the land market, because land prices have 
been increasing rapidly over the years, and the sellers have to report significant capital gains from 
their land sales. Over the last 12 years, for example, the real price for arable land has increased in 
Finland by 200 %. Land has often been purchased at a low price at a distance in the past, inherited 
or otherwise received as a gift for free, which also decreases the deductibles in capital gains 
taxation – a market characteristic that at least potentially increases the amount of capital gains taxes 
collected. 
   5
The existing literature on the trade distorting effects and the lock-in-effects of capital 
gains taxes deal with securities and other assets than agricultural land (e.g. Dammon and Spatt 
1996; Ayers et al. 2007). These studies suggest that the lock-in-effect is likely to be significant also 
in the agricultural land market, but it is obvious their results cannot be generalized to the trade of 
land and used in filling in this information gap for several reasons. First, land ownership involves, 
as such, significant non-monetary and non-marketable values that are not necessarily involved in 
owning other real assets. Landowner objectives vary from economic objectives to large variety of 
non-market objectives such as recreation or conservation (Kline et al. 2000a, Kline et al. 2000b, 
Kendra & Hull 2005, Majumdar et al. 2008). The non-monetary objectives have been found to be 
useful in understanding and predicting land owner economic behaviour (e.g. Kuuluvainen et al. 
1996, Ovaskainen ym. 2006), and reactions to policy alternatives (Kline et al. 2000a, Kline et al. 
2000b). Some owners are also found to be passive towards their land property, meaning that they do 
not have expectations to receive monetary or non-monetary benefits from the ownership, or these 
expectations do not matter (e.g. Kline et al. 2000a, Kline et al. 2000b). Because of these non-market 
objectives some landowners may be particularly insensitive to changes in tax policy and some 
owners, especially the passive ones, may be eager to take the bait of possible tax reduction.     
Land can also be characterized as a strategic platform, which is expected to open 
valuable new business options and opportunities in the future, while in other asset markets these 
options may have already been, for the most part, executed. An example is a future option to 
convert land to a more intensive land use, such as housing. For some land owners, these future 
options may also involve selling or donating their land to the land conservation programs. However, 
the recent literature suggests that the trade and competition over assets, which are characterized as 
strategic platforms, can result in unpredictable outcomes in particular when the competition 
involves a small number of agents, as is often the case in local land market (Stillman 2005, Mason 
and Weeds 2005, Huisman et al. 2003). Spatial questions and speculations over land use are hard to   6
reveal, but larger scale regionalism, based on regional history and heritage in agriculture, can be 
observed in land owner choices. Thus, the land owners and the local land market’s response to the 
capital gains taxes is a valuable empirical question that has distributional consequences in 
reforming the tax policy.  
 
The institutions of Finnish land market and capital gains tax  
The fragmented land ownership and farming structure in Finland is a result of two major land 
reforms in the past. The land reform of 1922, freed the land tenants and gave them the right to 
purchase the land they have been cultivating under tenancy. The second reform was after the 
Second World War when land was allocated to war veterans and farmers, who have lost their land 
to Russia. This arable land was either cleared from the forest or taken from the large existing farms. 
As the result, the number of small sized, owner occupied farms increased and the average farm size 
decreased until 1950’s.   
The farm size turned to an upward sloping trend in 1970’s, but it was Finland’s entry 
to European Union in 1995 that initiated a new and drastic structural adjustment period in the 
Finnish agriculture. Small farms started to exit and quit faster than before, while others started to 
expand their operations and their expansions were supported by the agricultural adjustment and 
investment programs. However, compared to the overall structural development since 1995, the 
trade of land has been to some extent stagnated. About 40,000 hectares of arable land has been 
traded annually, which accounts only for 1.7% from the total arable land area of 2.4 million 
hectares (Figure 1). About half these hectares (20,000 hectares) are transactions between 
nonrelatives and subjected to the capital gain tax (Figure 2).  
Because the trade for land has been, at least to some extent, locked in small volumes 
the fast structural development and concentration of active farming into a smaller number of larger 
farms has been feasible through increased land leasing. Approximately two thirds of the structural   7
development in active farming has been realized through land leasing and only a third through trade 
for land. As a result, already more than one third (750,000 hectares) of all arable land is currently 
cultivated under lease contracts. The number of land owners has been increasing, e.g. through 
inheritance, while the number of active farmers has been decreasing. The number of land owners is 
estimated at 487,000 and about one out of ten persons are owners of arable land. The number of 
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Figure 1: Land price and the number of trade transactions and the total transacted area in 1998-
2007. 
 
In Finland the trade for agricultural land belongs to the common capital gains tax scheme and the 
capital gains are not taxed until the owner sells the land. When the land is sold, capital gains tax is 
carried out from the discrepancy (arbitrage) between the selling price and the deductable expenses. 
Under the standard scheme the deductable expenses involve the purchase price and different closing 
fees that are required for registering the land ownership. The level of the tax has varied in resent 
decades: the capital gains tax rate was increased from 25%-points to 29%-points in 1996, however, 
decreased to 28% in 2005. More recently, also the formulas for deductibles were adjusted to   8
increase the effective tax rates in collecting the tax. As the result, the total sum of capital gains taxes 



























Figure 2: Transacted hectares in 1998-2007 on sale categories.  
 
This standard has, nevertheless, two main exceptions. First, when the seller has owned 
the land for at least ten years before selling it, either the true purchasing price or a computational 
40% deductible out from the selling price can be applied. Therefore, the capital gains tax is in this 
case  at the most 17% out from the sales price, i.e. 28% share out from the 60% taxable revenue 
share, net of the 40% deductible. The deduction was reduced from 50% to the current 40% in 2005. 
Thus, the capital gains tax constitutes a significant share out from the sales price. It also has two 
time regimes: “the short regime” with higher tax and “the long regime” with lower tax. Dammon 
and Spatt (1996) show that, in particular, this type of two regime capital gains tax defers tax 
triggering sales within the short, high tax regime.  
The second commonly realized exception deals with farm successions. When a 
retiring farmer sells the whole farm, i.e. land jointly with the farm compound, to a new farmer, most   9
often to one of his/her siblings as a farm succession package, the retiring farmer does not have to 
pay a capital gains tax from the sales price. In addition, there are some special stipulations and tax 
exceptions when the land is sold or donated to natural conservation purposes. These waiver 
programs deal for the most part, nevertheless, forest land and not arable land.  
In 2006 the annual tax revenue from capital gain taxes on farmland sales was 
approximated at Euro 18 million. The median price for land was Euro 6250 per hectare and the 
capital gains tax realized per hectare of land traded was approximately Euro 900 (15%). These 
figures involve trade transactions for pure arable land, without farm compounds. The farm 
successions and other whole farm transactions are excluded from the figures (Figure 1).  
From the observed data presented in Figures 1 and 2 one could postulate, that the 
capital gains taxes imposed to land sales have been decreasing land sales and driving the land 
ownership apart from active farmers. 
 
Method  
The econometric models estimating land owners’ willingness to sell land are for the most part based 
on an earlier and more methods oriented article of Myyrä & Pouta (forthcoming). These models are 
built on survey data from a random sample of Finnish land owners, including both active farmers, 
and passive land owners who either rent their field to active farmers or have set them aside. The 
monograph of Myyrä et al. (2008) describes in detail the data sampling and collection procedures, 
such as design of the mail survey that was used to acquire data on landowners’ sale decisions and 
intentions. The mail survey yielded a total of 2 684 observations from the sample of landowners. 
This amounts to 47% of the total number of mailed questionnaires. In addition to the mail survey 
data, information from the register of agricultural taxation and income taxation was available for the 
respondents, including income from agriculture.    10
The questionnaire focused on a single parcel of farmland owned by the responding 
landowner and covered the past land sales during the previous ten years and future selling 
intentions. Hypothetical policy, the taxation on the proceeds of a farmland sale (TTF), were 
introduced for respondents. TTF currently averages €900/ha, which is about 28% of the average 
difference between the assumed or actual purchase and selling prices (i.e. “arbitrace”). In the 
questionnaire, landowners were asked about their willingness to sell their agricultural land under 
conditions where the current tax (€900) would be immediately reduced for five year period from 
€900/ha to the level quoted in the questionnaire €600/ha, €300/ha, €100/ha or €0/ha.  
Myyrä & Pouta (forthcoming) used logit models to explain past sales and future 
selling intentions without a tax policy and under TTF scenario. The self selection bias was tested 
but found not significant. Their models for past sales, selling intentions and selling intentions under 
TTF are presented in Appendix 1. 
These models and the same data set were used to simulate the effect of tax policy and 
the level of tax on selling probability. By adding ten new observations for each respondent 
corresponding tax levels from €900, 800 etc. to 0, the reactions for varying taxes were calculated. 
All simulated observations were then used to estimate the probability for land sale in all possible tax 
levels. Sale was predicted if estimated probability exceeded 0.5. 
 
Results 
The simulation results show the effect of tax scheme on the land owners’ willingness to sell land 
(Figure 3).  Even if the overall level of the probability to sell land is low and as much as 87% of all 
land owners would not sell their land no matter what the tax rates are, adjustments in the tax rates 
would have economically considerable effect on the land market. If a temporary tax waiver program 
decreases the sales tax, for example, by one third, from Euro 900 to Euro 600 per hectare, the 
probability to sell land is predicted to increase by 50%, from 3.1%-points to 4.7%-points (Table 1,   11
Figure 3). A temporary abolition of the tax is predicted to quadruple the probability to sell land, as it 
is predicted to increase from 3.1%-points to 12.5%-points. Thus, the land owners’ willingness to 
sell land responds elastically to the tax scheme.  
  The results also indicate that the monetary information regarding the tax rates, as 
given in the questionnaires to the respondents, does not considerably bias the simulation results as 
simulated probabilities corresponded probabilities from data quite well. 
As mentioned above, approximately 20,000 hectares of land is traded annually, 
excluding the farm successions, gifts and transfers and could be defined as “arm-length”, and the 
resulting tax collected per hectare of traded land is Euro 900. This tax revenue sums up to a total of 
Euro 18 million. Using these figures as benchmarks, a temporary abolition of the tax would trigger 
(ceteris paribus) land trade that is four times the current volume. Without the tax, the traded total 
land area is predicted at 80,000 hectares. The price tag, in terms of government tax revenues, for the 
quadrupled quantity of land trade would then be a loss of Euro 18 million tax revenue, 
corresponding to Euro 225 per traded land hectare (Figure 3; Table 1).   
Decreasing the tax temporarily to Euro 100 per hectare of traded land would trigger 
land sales that are three times the current volume, i.e. 59,000 hectares, whereas the tax revenue 
would decrease from euro 18 million to Euro 5.9 million. Thus, tripling of the traded land quantity 
would decrease the tax revenue by two thirds, and the fiscal cost in terms of decreased tax revenue 
would be Euro 12 million. In this case, the lost tax revenue would be Euro 205 per traded land 
hectare.     
When the tax rate is decreased from the current Euro 900 per hectare towards zero, the 
tax revenue is predicted to remain first about its current level (at Euro 600 tax) and then decrease 
almost linearly to zero. Thus, the results predict that the current tax revenue could be maintained by 
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Figure 3. The predicted probability to sell land (the bars), the traded quantity of land (upwards 
sloping curve), and the tax revenue (downward sloping curve) conditional on alternative capital 
gains taxes (x-axis). The current tax rate is denoted by “900”.  
 
Given that about 60,000 hectares of land is annually transacted by trade and by a net 
increase in leasing from exiting farms to expanding farms, a tax cut to Euro 600 hectare would 
increase the quantity of annually traded land to above 30,000 hectares. This would be a sufficient 
increase (ceteris paribus) for maintaining the share between the leased and owner farmed land 
unchanged (Table 1). In other words, a tax waive of euro 300 would cease the tenancy problem 
from gradually increasing pattern and keep the land tenancy at its current level and this would not 
cut the total amount of taxes collected from the land sales. If the tax is cut to below Euro 400, the 
traded quantities are predicted to increase to at least 34,000 hectares, which would turn the share of 
land tenancy to a downward sloping trend.  
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Table 1. The simulated probabilities to sell land, traded quantities and aggregate tax revenues 
conditional on the capital gains tax.  





 Million Euro 
Probability to sell  
(% / 5 years) 
900  20 000  18.00  3.1 
800  32 710  26.17  5.07 
700  30 194  21.14  4.68 
600  30 194  18.12  4.68 
500  30 194  15.10  4.68 
400  33 935  13.57  5.26 
300  37 742  11.32  5.85 
200  45 290  9.06  7.02 
100  59 097  5.91  9.16 
0  80 516  0.00  12.48 
 
Concluding remarks 
Our results support the view that economic incentives, or merely disincentives, in terms of capital 
gains taxes that are collected from the trade of agricultural land matter. Land owner willingness to 
sell land is predicted to respond elastically with respect to temporary waives in the capital gains tax 
on land sales, even if it is characteristic that majority of land owners do not respond to economic 
incentives by selling their land. Thus, our results are consistent with the finance literature that the 
capital gains taxes significantly affect the timing of asset sales that trigger these tax payments. Land 
market as a whole does not make an exception to these results dealing with assets in general, even if 
land ownership involves a large amount of other than economic values. 
The results suggest that the tax collector has the power to redress the important 
foundations and incentive structures that are driving the gradually increasing land tenancy problem 
in agriculture –an institutional development pattern that is causing large economic losses in real 
economics by hindering irreversible land improvements and decreasing the efficiency of agri-
environmental programs. The trade distorting effects of capital gains taxes could be decreased 
(ceteris paribus) without fiscal losses to the extent that would cease the development towards land 
tenancy. In other words the gradual increase of real economic losses due to land tenancy could be 
stopped without decreasing or jeopardizing the government tax revenue.    14
The current development pattern could be reversed towards increasing land ownership 
of active farmers by decreasing the capital tax rate at least to a half from its current level. A tax 
waiver that would, for example, triple the traded land area would imply that two thirds of the tax 
revenue is lost. Abolishing the whole tax temporarily would quadruple the trade for land, which 
would clearly bring relief to the land tenure insecurity problem by turning the share of farmer 
owned land to an upward sloping trend.     
  It has to be noted, however, that our simulations involved a temporary tax waive as it 
is justified by the finance literature to get a large response. Then, the longer term linkage, say, 
between a sequence of temporary tax waiver programs and land owner response justifies at least a 
question mark. It is unfortunate that the data are not informative in identifying this important 
question and it is, therefore, left to a topic for future research. This new research would turn topical, 
in particular, if or once the temporary tax waiver program is going to be implemented. Nevertheless, 
we have signals from the option literature and empirical analyses on similar optimal timing 
problems that a policy uncertainty and public debate over the continuation of a temporary program 
that encourages to act triggers repeatedly action at the edge of expiry of the program, even if there 
is a significant likelihood that the program will be continued (see. e.g. Pietola et al. 2003). 
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Appendix 1. Full models, with no variable elimination. 











  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff.  p-value 
Constant  -2.6600 0.0007  -2.3776 0.0016  -0.9100 0.1956 
Gender (female2, male 1)  -0.3873  0.0259  0.2616  0.0773  0.2426  0.0658 
Age  (continuous)    -0.0207 0.1048  0.0254 0.0126  0.0148 0.1224 
Education  (continuous)    0.1515 0.2912  -0.2448 0.0836  -0.3367 0.0078 
Employment      
                       employee (ref.) 
        
 
farmer    -0.7075 0.1208  -0.0323 0.9314  -0.3201 0.3547 
entrepreneur    -0.1118 0.8096  0.1047 0.8042  0.2772 0.4912 
retired    1.0667 0.0036  -0.9340 0.0077  -0.3913 0.2144 
other    -0.2921 0.6925  0.9158 0.0460  0.2492 0.6049 
Objective              
         agricultural earner (ref.) 
        
 
part-time  farmer  -0.2609 0.4265  0.0311 0.9114  -0.3354 0.2217 
investor  -0.1899 0.5179  -0.0933 0.7325  0.1179 0.6207 
immaterialist  0.0063 0.9830  -0.7146 0.0226  -0.7179 0.0090 
indifferent  owner  0.7268 0.0082  0.8277 0.0036  0.6886 0.0096 
Agricultural income                 
                               none (ref.) 
        
 
                                 only rent  0.3153  0.3270  0.3361  0.2373  0.5027  0.0477 
                               from sales  0.2396  0.4926  -0.1431  0.6301  -0.1884  0.4852 
                        only subsidies  -0.3321  0.6447  0.3269  0.4952  0.1729  0.7040 
Region                            
                              south (ref.) 
        
 
east  0.1627 0.5228  -0.1797 0.5003  -0.7577 0.0307 
west  0.5377 0.0438  0.4087 0.1293  1.2315 0.0001 
north  -0.6245 0.0975  -0.2848 0.3811  -0.3549 0.3406 
Expectations of profit from 
other investments (%) 
0.0070 0.7593  0.0654 0.0011  0.0563 0.0025 
Adult children living on their 
own 
0.1594 0.1590  0.1591 0.1559  0.1538 0.1434 
Previous  sales      0.5181 0.0209  0.7048 0.0011 
Tax bid          -0.0002  0.7847 
District * Tax                        
                                 south ref. 
    
 
  
east         -0.0001  0.9482 
west         -0.0052  0.0034 
north         -0.0004  0.8095 
N (weighted)  864.1    506.5    512.0   
Sell on data, %  6.5    14.9    20.9   
Sell based on model, %  0    4.0    9.0   
Correctly classified, % (cut-
off point 0.50) 
93.4   83.8    78.5   
Log-likelihood (model)  -759    -738    -867   
Log-likelihood (constant)  -832    -854    -1048   
p-value <0.001    0.003    <0.001   
Pseudo-R
2 0.09    0.16    0.17   
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